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Markdown edition

# Mittwald begins restoring access after renewed attacks

> MCP remains unavailable after an earlier intrusion.

By BIGCHANGE.AI Editorial

Published: 2026-11-13T10:47:38.202Z
Updated: 2026-11-13T10:47:38.202Z
Canonical: https://bigchange.ai/blog/mittwald-renewed-attacks-mcp-incident

![Illustration of a site owner reviewing a notice.](https://bigchange.ai/api/media/file/notice-v2.png)
AI-generated illustration for BIG CHANGE.

Mittwald says it restored mStudio and project SSH access at 11:03 CET on November 13, following renewed attacks. Its customer center was still rolling out, with completion expected around noon.

## The big change

- Mittwald distinguishes a corporate-website compromise from an earlier MCP intrusion. A restoration announcement does not establish which individual projects were affected.
- The earlier investigation examined 56 compromised projects. That figure belongs to the previous incident and must not be treated as a count of damage from the renewed attack.
- MCP connects an AI assistant to hosting functions. Its own availability matters separately from a website loading or a customer being able to sign into a management portal.

## What has been restored

In its [November 12 status update](https://www.mittwald-status.de/incidents/255116), the host reported its website compromised but no detected internal-system access. It suspended customer-center, mStudio and SSH access as a precaution, while saying hosted sites remained reachable.

The November 13 update reported no further unauthorized access, added CAPTCHA and email-based two-factor authentication, and promised a postmortem. These are company statements, not an independent verification of security or customer-center rollout completion.

For a site owner, three questions need separate answers: does the public site load, can its owner administer it, and is the project's data intact? Availability answers the first question without necessarily answering the other two. A working login likewise cannot establish whether earlier unauthorized changes occurred.

## The earlier intrusion

Mittwald's [November 7 account](https://www.mittwald.de/blog/mittwald/sicherheitsvorfall-am-mcp-server) says an attacker tested a weakness on October 21 and exploited it on October 27. The company discovered unusual activity on November 4 and identified its MCP server as the entry point.

It said it treated data from October 27 onward as compromised and examined 56 compromised projects, finding no further affected projects after repeated scans. On November 7 it reported mStudio and SSH restored, while precautionarily blocked sites remained blocked. These findings describe that investigation.

Mittwald inferred AI-tool use from the speed of earlier steps in its logs. Its later status also attributes the attacks to automated AI systems, without disclosing the method. That attribution is not independently verified.

## Why the MCP connection matters

The [developer documentation](https://developer.mittwald.de/docs/v2/agentic-integration/mcp/) says the MCP server is unavailable, with no information on whether or when it will return. Its setup instructions should therefore not be read as a current service-availability announcement.

MCP means Model Context Protocol. In Mittwald's documented design, an assistant sends requests to the MCP server, which translates them into hosting API calls and returns the results. One example asks the assistant to list the user's projects. This explains the interface's administrative role; it does not identify the exploited vulnerability.

The documented authentication flow has the user sign in through a browser, approve specific permissions and give the tool a temporary token. Those design statements describe the intended controls, not evidence that an incident could not occur.

## Sources

- [Mittwald status updates](https://www.mittwald-status.de/incidents/255116) — Access updates.
- [Mittwald incident account](https://www.mittwald.de/blog/mittwald/sicherheitsvorfall-am-mcp-server) — Indexed original; direct page returned 404.
- [Mittwald MCP documentation](https://developer.mittwald.de/docs/v2/agentic-integration/mcp/) — Integration and unavailable status.